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evidence may be developed bearing upon the agency relation-
ship between defendant and the committee and upon plaintiffs' 
right to call Levitt as an adverse witness. 
The judgment is reversed. The purported appeals from the 
verdict and from the order denying plaintiffs' motion for a 
new trial are dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22765. In Bank. Nov. 13, 1953.] 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COM-
pANY OF WISCONSIN (a Corporation), Petitioner, 
v. INDUSrrRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and 
FRED E. GIDEON, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to 
Employment.-An injury suffered from a fall on employer's 
premises, in course of employment, from a height or on or 
against some object, arises out of employment and is com-
pensable though fall was caused by an idiopathic condition 
of employee. 
[2] Id.- Compensable Injuries- Relation to Employment.-The 
reasoning that an injury caused by impact of employee's body 
with object or surface of employer's premises arises out of 
employment because such injury is an incident thereof, though 
the fall may also have been causal factor which had no con-
nection with employment, is equally applicable where fall is 
merely to floor or ground, in course of employment, and death 
or injury results from striking floor or ground. 
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Though 
an injury to be compensable must arise out of employment, 
the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by employer nor 
peculiar to employment in sense that it would not have occurred 
elsewhere. 
[ 4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-Causal 
connection between employment and injury need not be sole 
cause; it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 61; "Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 209 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 8] Workmen's Compensation, § 72; 
[4] Workmen's Compensation,§ 74; [5] Workmen's Compensation, 
§93; [6] Workmen's Compensation, §71; [7] Workmen's Com-
pensation, §§ 72, 74. 
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Id.- Compensable -Risks of Streets and Travel.-
·where a person is to be on streets in course of his 
employment and falls to street, injury arises out of 
employment. 
Id.- Compensable 
doubts as to whether an are to be re-
solved in favor of employee. 
[7a, 7b] !d.-Compensable -Relation to Employment.-
It is not a for annulling award of compensation that 
employee might have had a fall (resulting in bodily injury) 
caused an condition but occurring at home, on 
street or elsewhere when he was attending to his private affairs; 
if he injured himsBlf whiltJ at work, on his employer's premises, 
the injury being the striking of his head against a concrete 
floor, a condition incident to employment, his condition may 
have been a contributory cause but it was not sole cause of 
his injury, and resolving all doubts in favor of commission's 
finding that injury arose out of employment, the award will 
be affirmed. 
[8] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-If em-
ployee fell to ground Ol' iloor in course of his employment and 
as a result was injured, the would be compensable 
whether cause of fall was a slippery or defective floor, or was 
due to nothing more than his innate awkwardness or even 
carelessness. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial .Acci-
dent Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries. 
A ward affirmed. 
Spray, Gould & Bowers and C. W. Bowers for Petitioner. 
Keith, Creede & Sedgwick and IN. N. Mullen, as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., and T. Groezinger for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.--A panel of the Industrial Accident Com-
mission denied workmen's compensation to the applicant, 
Pred E. Gideon, employee of Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., 
on the ground that, while the head injury suffered by him 
occurred in the course of his employment, it did not arise 
out of it. On reconsideration, it found the injury both 
occurred in the course and arose out of the employment and 
awarded compensation. That award is here for review. 
The facts are not disputed. Gideon was on the job on his 
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employer's premises and working for his employer. He was 
suffering from a headache after returning from the employer's 
dispensary where he had obtained aspirin to relieve it, and 
while walking down an aisle on his employer's premises, he 
had an idiopathic seizure not connected with his employment, 
which caused him to fall to the concrete floor and strike his 
head thereon, causing the injuries to his head for which 
compensation was awarded. There is no question that the 
injury occurred in the course of the employment. The dis-
pute is whether it arose out of his employment. 
[1] It is settled in this state and elsewhere that an in-
jury suffered from a fall on the employer's premises, in the 
course of employment, from a height or on or against some 
object, arises out of the employment and is compensable, 
even though the fall was caused by an idiopathic condition 
of the employee (National Auto. etc. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 75 Cal.App.2d 677 [171 P.2d 594], where numerous 
authorities are cited), and it is pointed out that Brooker v. 
Industrial Ace. Corn., 176 Cal. 275 [168 P. 126, L.R.A. 1918F 
878], to the contrary, is no longer the law since G. L. Eastman 
Go. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 186 Cal. 587 [200 P. 17], and 
California etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 59 Cal.App. 225 
[210 P. 524] (see cases collected in Horovitz on Workmen's 
Compensation, p. 144 et seq.; Horovitz, Current Trends in 
Workmen's Compensation, p. 649 et seq.; Schneider's Work-
men's Compensation (Text-Perm. Ed.), § 1376). [2] The 
reasoning of those authorities is that the injury for which 
compensation is sought, was caused by the impact of the em-
ployee's body with an object or surface of the employer's 
premises, and hence arose out of the employment, because such 
injury was an incident thereof, although the fall may also 
have been a causal factor which had no connection with the 
employment. That reasoning is equally applicable where the 
fall is merely to the floor or ground, in the course of the 
employment, and death or injury results from striking the 
floor or ground. It has been held that such injury arises out 
of the employment, and is compensable, although the fall was 
caused by a disease of the employee, having no relation to 
the employment. (See Barlau v. Minneapolis-Moline Power 
Implement Co., 214 Minn. 564 [9 N.W.2d 6] ; President & 
Directors of Georgetown College v. Stone, 61 App.D.C. 200 
[59 F.2d 875]; Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343 
[189 A. 599]; Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Com., 300 Ill. 
87 [132 N.E. 759, 19 A.L.R. 80] ; General Ins. Corp. v. Wicker-
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sham, (Tex.Oiv.App.) 235 S.W.2d 215, writ of error refused, 
149 'l'ex. 679; Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1 [236 S.W.2d 977]; 
Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind.App. 483 [39 
N.E.2d 499] ; Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind.App. 216 
[83 N.E.2d 623, 85 N.E.2d 263]; Watson v. Grimm,-- Md. 
-- [90 A.2d 180]; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 61 
App.D.C. 306 [62 F.2d 468]; cert. denied, 288 U.S. 608 [53 
S.Ct. 400, 77 L.Ed. 982] ; Protect~t Awning Shutter Co. v. 
Cline, 154 Fla. 30 [16 So.2d 342] ; Horovitz, Stepping and 
Falling, 4 N.A.C.O.A. Law Journal 64; Schneider's Work-
men's Compensation (Text-Perm.Ed.), § 1376.) In General 
Ins. Cm·p. v. W1:ckeTsham, supra, the court said: "The con-
flicting views in the cases where the employee is injured by 
falling on the floor or ground, as distinguished from falling 
from ladders, or into holes, or against objects other than the 
floor or ground, are exemplified by the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in AndTews v. L. &; S. Amusement CoTporation, 
253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506, where compensation was denied, 
and in Savage v. St. Aeden's Ch1trch, 122 Conn. 343, 189 A. 
599, where compensation was awarded .... 
''The cases denying compensation do so on the theory that 
a floor presents no risk or hazard that is not encountered 
everywhere, and that such risks and perils as they do present 
are only those which confront all members of the public. The 
cases allowing compensation do so on the theory that the 
injury need not be the product of a peril or hazard which 
exposes the employee to extraordinary risk, in order to be 
compensable, and that the hazard presented by the floor 
renders the injury compensable, not because it should have 
been foreseen or expected, but because it is a hazard that is 
peculiar to the employment and is one that is incidental to 
and grows out of the employment .... 
"It is our belief, and we so hold, that the attempted· dis-
tinction between cases where the employee falls from a ladder, 
or into a hole, or against some object, and those where the 
employee falls to the ground or floor, is without a reasonable 
basis.'' There are cases to the contrary but the modern trend 
is definitely in accordance with the view above expressed. 
The contrary holdings in denying compensation overlook 
several important principles. [3] Though an injury to be 
compensable must arise out of the employment, that is, occur 
by reason of a condition or incident of employment, the 
injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer nor 
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peculiar to the employment in the sense that it would not 
have occurred elsewhere. (Pacific Ernp. Ins. Co. v. Indust1·ial 
Ace. Corn., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313] ; Pacific 
Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 19 Cal.2d 622 [122 P.2d 
570, 141 A.L.R. 798].) If we look for a causal con-
nection between the employment and the injury, such connec-
tion need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient if it is a con-
tributory cause. (Colonial Ins. Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. Corn., 
29 Cal.2d 79 [ 172 P .2d 884] . ) Where a person is re-
quired to be on the streets in the course of his employment 
and falls to the street, the resulting injury arises out of the 
employment. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
194 Cal. 28 [227 P. 168] .) [6] And finally" ... reasonable 
doubts as to whether an injury is compensable are to be re-
solved in favor of the employe." (Truck Ins. Exch. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Com., 27 Cal.2d 813, 816 [167 P.2d 705] ; Lum-
bermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ind~tstrial Ace. Com., 29 Cal.2d 
492 [175 P.2d 823]; Indnstr·ial Indem: Exch. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 130 [156 P.2d 926].) 
[7a] Thus in the instant case it is not a ground for an-
nulling the award of compensation that the employee might 
have had a fall (resulting in bodily injury) caused by an 
idiopathic condition but occurring at home, on the street or 
elsewhere when he was tending to his private affairs. The fact 
remains that he injured himself while at work, on his em-
ployer's premises, the injury being the striking of his head 
against the floor, a condition incident to the employment. 
His condition may have been a contributory cause but it was 
not the sole cause of his injury. [8] It would not be doubted 
that if an employee fell to the ground or floor in the course 
of his employment, and as a result was injured, the injury 
would be compensable whether the cause of the fall was a 
slippery or defective floor, or was due to nothing more than 
his innate awkwardness or even carelessness. [7b] Cer-
tainly, resolving all doubts in favor of the commission's find-
ing that the injury arose out of the employment, compels an 
affirmance of the award. 
A ward affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-1 dissent. 
The uncontradicted evidence, as stated in the majority 
opinion, shows that the injured employee, while walking down 
an aisle on his employer's premises, "had an idiopathic seiz-
Nov. 1953] EMPI .. OYERR ETC. INs. Co. v. lND. Ace. CoM. 681 
[41 C.2d 676; 263 P.2d 4] 
urc not connected with his which caused him to 
fall to the concrete floor and strike his head causing 
the injuries to his head for which was awarded.'' 
l am of the opinion that the record of any 
evidence to sustain the essential was 
one ''arising out of ... the Code, 
§ ; and that therefore tlle award must be annulled. 
The decisions of this court demonstrate that a liberal 
eonstrnction has been placed upon the "in the course 
of the employment" and "arising out of the employment" 
in line with the statutory direction. (Lab. § 3202.) 
But there comes a point 1vhere so-called liberal construction, 
if earried beyond permissible limits, can result in nullification 
of express statutory requirements; and in my such point 
has been reached in the majority opinion. It is clear that 
tbP statutory phrases "in the course of the employment" and 
"arising out of the employment" were not intended to be 
ir1entical in meaning; but the result of the majority opinion 
is to make compensable every injury arising out of an idio-
pathic seizure, provided only that it occurs ''in the course 
of the employment.'' Hence the requirement that the injury 
must also be one ''arising out of the employment'' is in effect 
eliminated from the statute. 
It is true that the courts have encountered difficulty in con-
struing that phrase, but the courts of this state have not here-
tofore g·one so far as to render it meaningless. In many of 
J·he ''fall'' cases mentioned in the majority opinion, the cause 
of the fall was unknown. In some, the employee fell from 
er1nipment furnished by the employer. In others, the employee 
fell onto or against tile equipment of the employer or into 
an opening or other hazard encountered at the place where the 
employee was performing his work. The reasoning of some 
of the cases, like that in the majority opinion, is not entirely 
e lear. But in eYery well considered case in which an injury 
nsnlting from a fall has been held compensable as arising 
ont of the Pmployment, the evidence was such that it might 
be inferred either ( 1) that the fall resulted, at 
lenst in part, from some activity connected with the employ-
mrnt or (2) tlJat the ensuing injury resulted, at least in part, 
from .~ome peculiar eondition or hazard which the employee 
rneountered as an incident to this In the ab-
sence of any evidence from which one or the other of these 
tv;o inferences can be drawn, there can be no basis :for a 
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finding that the injury was one ''arising out of the employ-
ment." 
In the present case the uncontradicted evidence shows that 
the fall resulted solely from an idiopathic seizure which was 
in no way connected with the employment; and that the 
ensuing injury resulted solely from striking the floor. It is 
therefore clear that neither of the above inferences may be 
drawn. The mere existence of an ordinary floor, which has 
no relation to the injury other than to furnish the landing 
place for an employee who suffers an "idiopathic seizure not 
connected with his employment," cannot fairly be said to con-
stitute a peculiar condition or hazard incident to the employ-
ment so as to meet the above-mentioned requirements. 
If as a matter of policy, every injury sustained in the course 
of the employment is to be made compensable, the Legislature 
rather than the courts should make that determination. But 
as long as the statute expressly makes the additional require-
ment that the injury be one ''arising out of the employment,'' 
the courts should not, under the guise of liberal construction, 
ignore the statutory mandate. 
I would therefore annul the award. 
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied De-
cember 10, 1953. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
